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Strategic Arms Control: Russia Takes the Offensive
By SARAH K. MILLER and RICHARD MILLER
On 13 November, Russian President Vladimir Putin presented a new arms control 
proposal which would reduce the US and Russian inventories to 1,500 warheads each 
by 2008, representing accelerated reduction below the START-II levels. (1) This 
proposal was floated after a four-month lull in arms control discussions following 
President Clinton's decision to defer limited fielding of a US National Missile Defense 
(NMD) system to the next administration. Putin's comments indicate a push not only to 
reinvigorate the arms control discussions, but also to shift the dialogue to terms more 
favorable for the Russian side.
Whereas during the summer Russian officials threatened unilateral and "asymmetrical 
steps" if the Americans fielded NMD, in mid-November Russian officials sought to 
capture the public relations high ground by offering to accept very low warhead ceilings. 
This tactical shift allows Russia to seize the initiative in the international arms control 
community while continuing to play on anti-missile defense sentiment in China and 
among the Western European powers. The timing of the proposal capitalizes on 
America's preoccupation with the election and transition to a new administration.
From the vantage point of Russian defense planning, Putin's latest proposal follows 
through on a recent change in priorities to a course more closely aligned with current 
capabilities and resources. These budgetary concerns, and associated internal 
reorganizations, appear to influence Russian foreign policy as much as strategic and 
diplomatic considerations. Thus, Moscow's policies are aimed at preserving: 1) its status 
as a major power in the nuclear arena; and 2) unaltered continuation of the ABM treaty 
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and other strategic protocols, while simultaneously managing the inevitable atrophy of 
the Russian nuclear arsenal.
Diplomatic Considerations
Strategic forces and arms control constitute the last vestige of superpower status which 
the state inherited from the Soviet Union. Arms control has enjoyed high priority in US-
Russian relations, and remains a weathervane of the bilateral relationship. Last 
summer, in the wake of US NMD testing, the arms control dialogue hit a deep rut. 
Moscow's rhetoric throughout the summer suggested that the former superpower would 
react quite negatively if the US chose to implement NMD. Russia threatened a variety of 
"asymmetrical steps" among which Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Commander Vladimir 
Yakovlev included rebuilding a Russian short- and intermediate-range missile force as 
well as "changing the principles of the combat equipment of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles" (in other words, increasing the number of nuclear warheads on the missiles, 
known as "mirving"). (2)
Putin's recent proposal reaffirms the importance Russia still attaches to arms control. 
Putin timed his nuclear proposal for his final meeting with President Clinton at the Asia-
Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) in Brunei to signal Russia's emphasis on the 
issue and to jump-start a new round of talks. During the meeting, Putin called for "no 
pause in nuclear disarmament," saying that "reaching radically lower levels ... is quite 
possible ... but is not the limit. We are prepared to consider lower levels in the 
future." (3)
The Russian leadership seems concerned about the lull in the bilateral arms 
relationship and its prolongation as a result of the US election and the possible decision 
by the new US administration to field a limited NMD. With these uncertainties looming 
ahead, sources in the Russian foreign ministry have reiterated that Putin's proposal "is 
not a propaganda gimmick but a position thoroughly verified by the military and political 
leaders and aimed at practical implementation." (4) In this manner, the Russian 
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government is presenting the image of a concerned, rational state, seeking to preserve 
international stability through practical peaceful measures.
Preservation of Strategic Protocols
The threat issued earlier this month by the head of the foreign ministry's Security and 
Disarmament Department, Yuri Kapralov, that Russia is "capable of responding to the 
deployment of NMD ... and we have the necessary technological means for this," was 
tempered by his statement that Russia "will not respond to the deployment with a similar 
step." Moreover, he said, "it is not in Russia's interest to spend money on this [since] we 
have other objectives, we must improve the living standards of our populations and 
pursue political reforms." (5)
However, as Kapralov's statements indicate, Putin's nuclear initiative and its implicit 
flexibility does not mean that Moscow has changed its stance on NMD or its desire to 
preserve the ABM treaty, which it continues to present as a cornerstone of international 
security. The initiative does allow Russia to paint itself as a prudent, peace-loving state 
both at home and abroad. In fact, internationally, Russia's apparent seriousness on the 
matter coincides with and bolsters its recent diplomatic efforts to build support in Europe 
and Asia for blocking change in the ABM treaty.
In the past six months, Putin has placed a diplomatic premium on rallying international 
support against NMD or abrogation of the ABM treaty, thereby raising the pressure on 
the next US administration to uphold the treaty and at least to continue the arms control 
and reduction dialogue. Whether courting the CIS, China, EU countries (or the very 
same "states of concern" against whom the US needs NMD to defend), Putin has taken 
every opportunity to attack US NMD plans. (6) Moreover, even though Russia's 
diplomatic maneuvering may not prevent a future US administration from developing 
NMD, it certainly does send a clear signal to the US about the global impact its decision 
could have. Even more importantly, with international support behind him, Putin has 
been able to capitalize on Russia's enhanced standing at the September Millennium 
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summit and the November APEC meeting. If nothing else, NMD has become just 
another point on which Russia, Europe and other non-Western states have found 
common ground. 
Officials at various levels of the Russian military are also pushing Putin's initiative as 
they enter into discussions with their counterparts worldwide. While visiting senior 
Chinese military staff, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel-General Valery 
Manilov stated, "this is one of the most important problems concerning strategic stability, 
which is impossible without the observance of all the basic treaties and agreements, 
including the 1972 ABM Treaty. We are unanimous on this point with China and with our 
comrades [sic!] in the People's Liberation Army of China." (7) In upcoming visits to 
NATO headquarters in Brussels and London for bilateral talks in early December, 
Defense Minister Igor Sergeev is expected to bring up missile defense issues. This may 
include the Russian initiative for West European non-strategic missile defense as well 
as other bilateral discussions with British counterparts. (8)
For his part, SRF Commander Yakovlev predicted that "regardless of who heads the 
new US administration, there are considerable doubts as to whether America's senators 
will ratify the START-II treaty, given that the USA's withdrawal from the ABM treaty is 
now clearly being predicted." He characterized Putin's new arms reduction proposal as 
"... an invitation to dialogue on strategic arms reductions not only between Russia and 
the USA, but also with those countries that are striving to possess nuclear 
weapons." (9) 
Implications
The practical aspects of an aging nuclear force structure coupled with modest budgets 
and other significant funding priorities constitute another key motivation behind the 
Russian initiative. Throughout recent military budget and restructuring discussions, 
there has been an explicit and implicit recognition that Russia must reduce its nuclear 
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forces as policy makers come to terms with fiscal limitations and the reality of 
equipment obsolescence.
The new military budget only provides for a modest increase in defense spending, most 
of which will fund current operations in Chechnya, fix personnel problems and allow for 
very limited modernization of the conventional forces. (10) Additionally, General 
Yakovlev has stated already that at least five of the new Topol-M strategic missile 
systems slated to be placed in service in the upcoming months may not be delivered 
due to "financial problems." (11) Based on one test flight each in the past year, the SRF 
is prepared to extend the service life of several aging strategic rockets without further 
maintenance or modernization. (12) While this may work as a stopgap measure, without 
significant investment in the nuclear forces it will be impossible for Russia to maintain 
the forces allowed under the current terms of START-II or any semblance of parity with 
the US.
Finally, the SRF is experiencing the same pressure to generate cash through foreign 
sales as the remainder of the Russian armed forces. Current proposals may accelerate 
the refit of ICBM rocket motors to serve as boosters for commercial satellite payloads. 
As the international demand for this service grows in the coming years, Russian officials 
see it as a possible revenue source of up to $20 billion rubles. (13) Certainly, any further 
negotiated force reductions would boost the pace -- and profits -- of this program.
Aside from budgetary pressure, the debate on the size and shape of the Russian 
military also is influencing the push for negotiated arms reductions, as the once 
unquestioned prestige and priority of the SRF has come under attack. Recent military 
reorganization decisions have left the SRF intact as an independent military arm; 
however, indications point to an eventual breakup of the force and consolidation of its 
reduced segments with parts of the Army and Air Force. This appears to be the result of 
the internal struggle which erupted last summer between Defense Minister Igor Sergeev 
and Chief of Staff General Anatoli Kvashnin over the relative priorities of nuclear and 
conventional forces.
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As a former commander of the SRF, it was not surprising that Sergeev advocated 
maintaining the SRF's independence and prominent funding. However, it appears 
Kvashnin's argument has won favor with Putin. Resources are being realigned to arrest 
the continuing decay of the conventional forces, partially at the expense of the SRF. The 
military's difficulties in Chechnya and the public attention focused on the conventional 
forces' state of readiness following the Kursk disaster are among the factors cementing 
the foundation of this new focus in the defense force. Moreover, in the light of increased 
discussions about appointing a civilian defense minister, execution of the SRF 
realignment initiative and further reforms with their associated funding shifts may be 
halted only until Sergeev can be retired and is unable to offer bureaucratic resistance 
from within. It has been rumored that Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov is a 
leading candidate to replace Sergeev. Ivanov is known to support the reform policies as 
currently proposed. 
Summary
On the surface, the timing of Putin's nuclear proposal may appear to be simply a 
diplomatically motivated move meant to capitalize on the international climate and the 
travails of the US election cycle. Upon closer inspection, the proposal is rooted in deep 
Russian domestic political and military realities that policy makers no longer can afford 
to ignore. Negotiating a reduced warhead ceiling can serve two purposes: removing the 
financial burden of upkeep and uncertainty involved with maintaining an aging and 
potentially hazardous nuclear force and garnering international prestige by assuming 
the appearance of a prudent nuclear state that strives for arms control and reductions in 
the nuclear arsenal without making any concessions on the ABM or NMD. In this 
respect, Russia's move represents a clever tactic meant to reinvigorate Moscow's 
international standing, while minimizing the impact of the inevitable atrophy of its 
nuclear arsenal.
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